Purposiveness of Human Behavior. Integrating Behaviorist and Cognitivist Processes/Models

We try not just to reconcile but to “integrate” Cognitivism and Behaviorism by a theory of different forms of purposiveness in behavior and mind. This also implies a criticism of the Dual System theory and a claim on the strong interaction and integration of Sist1 (automatic) and Sist2 (deliberative), based on reasons, preferences, and decisions. We present a theory of different kinds of teleology. Mere “functions” of the behavior: finalism not represented in the mind of the agent, not “regulating” the behavior. Two kinds of teleological mental representations: true “Goals” in control-theory, cybernetic view, with “goal-driven” behavior (intentional action); vs. Expectations in Anticipatory Classifiers: a reactive but anticipatory device, explaining the “instrumental” (finalistic) nature of Skinner’s reinforcement learning. We present different kinds of Goals and goal processing and on this ground the theory of what “intentions” are. On such basis, we can discuss Kathy Wilkes’s hint about the necessarily linguistic formulation of “intentions”; with the hypothesis that her intuition is not correct for any kind on “intention” which may be represented in sensory-motor format, but correct for “volition” and our will-strength for socially influencing ourselves

The cognitive and behavioral mediation of institutions: Towards an account of institutional actions.

The aim of this paper is to provide an analysis of institutional actions from the standpoint of cognitive science. The notion of constitutive rules have been proposed to describe the conceptual nature of institutions. In this paper it is extended to cover specific processes of \u27recognition\u27 that provide the agents with additional artificial powers. The power of doing an institutional action is considered as a special kind of artificial power. It is argued that institutional actions achieve their effects thanks to a cognitive and behavioral mediation of a collective of agents. Individual actions are seen and treated as (count as) institutional actions by the involved participants even if, in fact, institutional actions are collective actions. When human behavior becomes institutionalized, it acquires special conventional powers to bring about effects in the social world. A model of such conventional empowerment of an agent is proposed and is identified in a sort of collective permission. Finally it is argued that institutions are a specific kind of coordination artifacts. In particular, the importance of institutional roles as artifacts that assign conventional powers is investigated

Trust and Transitivity: How trust-transfer works

Transitivity in trust is very often considered as a quite simple property, trivially inferable from the classical transitivity defined in mathematics, logic, or grammar. In fact the complexity of the trust notion suggests evaluating the relationships with the transitivity in a more adequate way. In this paper, starting from a socio-cognitive model of trust, we analyze the different aspects and conceptual frameworks involved in this relation and show how different interpretations of these concepts produce different solutions and definitions of trust transitivity

Arguments as Belief Structures: Towards a Toulmin Layout of Doxastic Dynamics?

Argumentation is a dialogical attempt to bring about a desired change in the beliefs of another agent – that is, to trigger a specific belief revision process in the mind of such agent. However, so far formal models of belief revision widely neglected any systematic comparison with argumentation theories, to the point that even the simplest argumentation structures cannot be captured within such models. In this essay, we endeavour to bring together argumentation and belief revision in the same formal framework, and to highlight the important role played by Toulmin’s layout of argument in fostering such integration

From Manifesta to Krypta: The Relevance of Categories for Trusting Others

In this paper we consider the special abilities needed by agents for assessing trust based on inference and reasoning. We analyze the case in which it is possible to infer trust towards unknown counterparts by reasoning on abstract classes or categories of agents shaped in a concrete application domain. We present a scenario of interacting agents providing a computational model implementing different strategies to assess trust. Assuming a medical domain, categories, including both competencies and dispositions of possible trustees, are exploited to infer trust towards possibly unknown counterparts. The proposed approach for the cognitive assessment of trust relies on agents' abilities to analyze heterogeneous information sources along different dimensions. Trust is inferred based on specific observable properties (Manifesta), namely explicitly readable signals indicating internal features (Krypta) regulating agents' behavior and effectiveness on specific tasks. Simulative experiments evaluate the performance of trusting agents adopting different strategies to delegate tasks to possibly unknown trustees, while experimental results show the relevance of this kind of cognitive ability in the case of open Multi Agent Systems

Influence of social motivation over belief dynamics: A game-theoretical analysis

This paper provides a game-theoretical description of social and motivational influence over belief dynamics of two arguing agents that hold contrasting views. The formal analysis shows how social influence depends on both (1) the agent\u27s own motives and (2) her beliefs concerning the motives of the other agent. Moreover, game-theoretical modelling of dialogical interaction with mutual ignorance of the agents\u27 motivational profiles reveals that (3) some information on the counterpart\u27s motivations have greater diagnostic value than others, and (4) such discontinuity in informational value again depends on the agent\u27s own motivations. Hence this game-theoretical analysis captures several features of the rich interplay between motivations and beliefs, and it allows for prediction of the specific motivational pressure being exerted on the agent\u27s belief dynamics, given her current frame of mind. Here the model is applied both to agents with exhaustive knowledge of each other preferences, and to agents with only partial assumptions on the motivational profile of their counterpart. In the final sections, we discuss the extension of this analysis to the single-agent case, and future empirical verification of the predictions generated by the model, via social experiments (e.g. experimental economics) and computational models (e.g. agent-based social simulation)

Facing Openness with Socio Cognitive Trust and Categories.

Typical solutions for agents assessing trust relies on the circulation of information on the individual level, i.e. reputational images, subjective experiences, statistical analysis, etc. This work presents an alternative approach, inspired to the cognitive heuristics enabling humans to reason at a categorial level. The approach is envisaged as a crucial ability for agents in order to: (1) estimate trustworthiness of unknown trustees based on an ascribed membership to categories; (2) learn a series of emergent relations between trustees observable properties and their effective abilities to fulfill tasks in situated conditions. On such a basis, categorization is provided to recognize signs (Manifesta) through which hidden capabilities (Kripta) can be inferred. Learning is provided to refine reasoning attitudes needed to ascribe tasks to categories. A series of architectures combining categorization abilities, individual experiences and context awareness are evaluated and compared in simulated experiments

Cognition, Joint Action and Collective Intentionality

No abstract availabl

Argumentation and data-oriented belief revision: On the two-sided nature of epistemic change

This paper aims to bring together two separate threads in the formal study of epistemic change: belief revision and argumentation theories. Belief revision describes the way in which an agent is supposed to change his own mind, while argumentation deals with persuasive strategies employed to change the mind of other agents. Belief change and argumentation are two sides (cognitive and social) of the same epistemic coin. Argumentation theories are therefore incomplete, if they cannot be grounded in belief revision models - and vice versa. Nonetheless, so far the formal treatment of belief revision widely neglected any systematic comparison with argumentation theories. Such lack of integration poses severe limitations to our understanding of epistemic change, and more comprehensive models should instead be devised. After a short critical review of the literature (cf. 1), we outline an alternative model of belief revision whose main claim is the distinction between data and beliefs (cf. 2), and we discuss in detail its expressivity with respect to argumentation (cf. 3): finally, we summarize our conclusions and future works on the interface between belief revision and argumentation (cf. 4)